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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BESSIE AUERBACH, ~-f.L~DELINE
A. WERNER, and SELh1A A.
~v10HR,

Plaintiffs and Appellants~
-vs.-

FANNIE F. AL SAMUELS, L. R.
Si\\lUELS, and ~FREDERICK FOX
1\UERBACH, and FANNIE F. i\.
SAiv1UELS1 L. R4 S ~~ M U E L S,
FREDERICK FOX A"CERB.:~CH,
and \\-~ALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY~ as Trustees of the Testamentary Trust created under the
terms of the Last Will and Testament
of FREDERICK S. AUERBACH,
deceased,

Case No. 9090

Defendants and Respondents4

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

A.
In an attempt to create a false atmosphere of candor
and fairness on the part of Fannie, the respondents refer:
to Fannie's statement in her petition to the Court of :~Vfay
161 1940 that she was t~willing to a bide by the construction of said \vill by this court, and the application thereto
of the facts, which shall be found by the court. {Respondents br. p. 6) *; to the District Court's order of May 21 ~
1

)
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1940, (entered on Fannie~s petition) exonerating her from
liability to the plain tiffs on account of the specific legacies ( pp. 7-8) ; and to Fannie,s statement in 1939 or
1940 that .r.r.there wasn,t enough left for you girls to get
each $1 0,000'' as something which the Court ~(did in fact
find. ~' (p. 16 )
The respondents, however, ignore the fact that the
May 1940 proceeding was not an adversary proceeding at
which plaintiffs were hcardr There was no adverse party
present at the hearing to point out to the Court that the
calculations used by Fannie in her petition were improper
and would unjustly deprive plaintiffs of their legacies .

Fannie's conduct, as was pointed out in plaintiffs,
main brief, caused them to refrain from appearing at the
May 1940 hearing, thus making it, in effect, an ex parte
hearing.. In this connection, the following statement of
the Court in In re Ricffs Estate~ 11 "Ltah 428 (discussed
at pp. 26-27 of

Appellants~

br.) in pertinent:

~ There

is an admitted exception to this general
rule in cases where~ by reason of something done by
the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. . .
Equity will relieve: one seeking relief from the
effect of a judgment or decree procured by the conduct of the successful party which prevents the injured party from appearing at the trial or hearing on
the merits.),
u: ••

B.
Respondents state (p. 15): the plaintiffs' sole objection to the order of 1940 is that they believe the Court
and Fannie were in error in makjng the computation in
that they improperly deducted taxes; and that plaintiffs
contend nothing more than an error by a court. This
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statement is erroneous. Apparently'j respondents have not
read plaintiffs1 brief very carefully. On page 30 of their
brief, plaintiffs request relief, for example: ~~on the
grounds of either extrinsic fraud or mistake~ or both.~!'

c.
Respondents do not deny: that in 1939 or 1940 }'annie
told the plaintiff, Madeline Werner, and her sister~ Jennie
. .-\uerbach, deceased, that there was not enough in :Frederick,s estate for the {'girls to get each ~ 10,000''; nor thal
Herbert told F aiUlie that he had to explain to plaintiffs
that they were not going to receive any inheritance from
Frederick,s estate, "because the net amount doesn~t come
up to the specified amounf'; nor that :Fannic~s attorney
told plaintiffs~ attorney that the value of the estate
''proved to be under $350,000.J'
Madeline Werner acted on behalf of her sisters, Bessie
Auerbach and Selma Mohr, the other plaintiffs herein,
and managed their affairs. (Apps.) Deps. p. 15~ ln 8-29;
p. 61,. In 13-21 ) And, the plaintiffs relied on Herbert,
F annie,s confidant* to look after their interests in Salt
Lake City4 (Apps.' Deps. p. 10, ln 7-9; p~ 61, ln 26-29;
p. 105, ln 24-30; P~ 106, ln 1-4)
~

Under all of the circumstances, the plaintiffs made no
inquiry of anyone 1 with respect to their rights or interest
in Frederick's estate, from the date of hill death in 1938
until immediately prior to the commencement of this
action in 1957. (Bessie Dep. p. 35, ln 18-29; Selma Dcp~
•Re:iipondcnt:s a:eem to object to plaintiffs~ reference in their brief to Herbert
as "Fannie~s confidane, (br. p. 31). But) Fannie hcrsdf, testified upon h.er
deposition that Herbert was her ''confidant'~ {p. 11, 1n 2 5 ; pT 21 ~ 1n 29 ) ,
and funher that Herbert was the om: with whom she 11 disc us:sed c:vP.:rySponsored
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p . 86, ln 29-30; p. 87, ln 1-11, 27-28; n1adeline Dep. p.
120, ln 24-30; P~ 121, ln. 1-5; p. 133, ln 28-30; p. 134~
ln 1-13) There \Vas no need for plaintiffs to inquire of
others concerning their interest in Frederick\ estate.
They had full confidence in r"'annir. and relied upon her
to do the right thing~

In this connection, Selma te~tif i ed upon her deposition, as follows (p. 87, ln 8~17) :
Q~

'r

ou didn't make any inquiry of Herbert
while he wa.s alive:J

A. No.
Q~

You didn't make any inquiry of Fan or Lcs?

A. No~ ~ever would make any inquiry of them.

Q. Why not?
i\~

I

wouldn~t~

Q~

\V.hy not?

Ar Well~ I just felt that we had confidence in
Fannie~ that if anything was coming to us that she
would eventual!}) give it to us . . /J
Bessie similarly testified (p. 40, ln 9-13) :
~'Q..

Going back to this, you make the statement
or the charge that because of all these things you
were mi.s1ed. No\v how \Vf"re you misled?

A. Well~ I thought Fannie vvould do as Fred
asked her naturally. Fred left the ten thousand; I
thought she as his executrix would carry out his
wishes.'~

And, Madeline testified (p~ 155, ln 16-23) ~

'"Q..

\·~ou knew in 1940 that you were to

receive

some money under the will, did you not?
A~ Just from what Herbert had said~ I would
never have asked Fannie. I considered she had been
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brought up to do the right thing. I have known her
since she was 12 years ,_;old, and I would think ultimately we would get it..... ,,
Mr. Otterbourg also testified {Otterbourg Dep. ) :

''Q.

In any event, in June of 1946, you did kno\v
at that time that Frederick had left in his will bequests to the girls, isn~t that correct?

A. YPs, 1 knevv that..
Q. And you knew that these bequests were in
the sum of S10,000 apiece?
.~.\.

Ycs~ I knc\v that.
Q~ And you kncv..~ the general provisions as to
the bequests~ general terms of the bequests?
i\.. I knew in a general 'vay if the e.state "vas
large enough, they'd get it; and if it \·vas not, they
\vould not." ( p. ~11 )

Again, with respect to lvf r~ Ingcbretsen~s reply dated
July 18. 1946, to his letter of July 12~ 1946:
~~Q~

'Verc you satisfied '"~ith the ans\vcrs that
you received?
,\. Surely; surely.

Q. Did you

for\Nard this information that you
had in this letter to the girls?
remember that I fonvarded it~ no.
My recollection is that at some time or other, not
thenJ because I'm sure they ~rete not here in ~ c"':o
\"~ork, but at some time or other, I may have mention~d it in passing, ''It is too b~?' but there isn,t enough
1n your estate for a legacy.. At some time. mavbe.

A. I

don~t

(pp~ 50-1)

~

~

Again,

''Q. So, as far as you were concerned you just
let the matter drop after receiving the letter from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. As far as I was concerned the situation was
that Mr. Ingebretsen, who had' been the family
COW1sel and who had been in the confidence of all
these people all these years and who had been Herbert~s lawyer~ wrote me these facts and I saw no need
to question it anv further, as far as I was concerned,
or to advise him; so we did not discuss it. 1 relied on
his statement., (pp~ 53-4) (Emphasis added)

Again,

''Q. Did Mrs. Weruer ever ask you as to whether
you received an answer to your letter of July 12 .

1946?
A. I think not, but I am not sure of that. I know
I must have told her~ and thafs my recollection, but
I would not know just when, at some point 'vhen they
got back from their vacation or something, ~'It
wasn't more than $350,000 in the estate:~ that was
too bad.:~' (p. 60) (Emphasis added)
Against the clear, undisputed and sworn testimony~
first of plaintiffs that they had full faith and confidence in
their sister-in-law, Fannie, and were relyjng on her to do
the right thing, second, of plaintiffs~ attorney that here·
lied without question on the written statement of Fannie's
attorney that there was not enough in the estate to pay
the legacies, third~ of plaintiffs, attorney that he commWlicated this information to 1\.frs. \-Verner and, fourth, of
Fannie herself that both she and Herbert informed plaintiffs there was not enough left for the girls to get each
$10,000,-against all this-j can Fannie now be heard
to argue plaintiffs were not lulled into inaction as a result
of her misrepresentations? No other inference is possible
on the facts but that the misrepresentations of value were
in fact made to plaintiffs and \\~"ere in fact relied upon by
plain tiffs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We recall again the decision of this court in the Rice
case that an cxecutor"s petition misconstruing the amount
of a legacy is extrinsic fraud (a fortiori -vvhere the executor
stands to profit by the act). We also emphasize again
under the doctrine of that case and the others cited by
plaintiffs, that Fannie's admitted misrepresentations are
not being ''tortured into extrinsic fraud~' as stated by
respondents. Such misrepresentations caused plaintiffs
to think they had no interest in the e.sta te, Iu lied them
into inaction and permitted :Fannie to obtain plaintiffst
property. Such misrepresentations constitute and are
extrinsic fraud under the applicable "Ctah authorities.
They also clearly had the effect of ddaying any suit by
pia in tiffs until discovery of the mistake in JWle, 195 7.

D.
Respondents contend (pp. 37-38) that Frederick intended that the estate and inheritance taxes be deducted
from the gross estate in computing the net value of his
estate~ They state (p~ 37): that Frederick wished that
a minimum sutn of $350,000 be placed in trust for F'annie
and her son to assure them of an annual income of
$1 7,500; and argue, in substance, that if taxes were de~
ducted from the value of the estate that Fannie and her
son might not obtain this minimum protection.

However, at pages 16-1 7 of their brief~ respondents
take a contrary view. 1""hcre the respondents assert that
Fredercik gave Herbert a right under the will to purchase
for one dollar all of the Auerbach store stock (valued at
$473,100.34 in Fannie's May 16, 1940 petition), and
that if Herbert exercised this right, the value of the estate
would have been depleted by over $300,000. Thus, based
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is clear that Frederick never intended that a minllnum
sum of $350~000 be placed in trust for the benefit of
Fannie and her son.
Moreover, Frederick left Fatmie insurance in the sum
of $121 ,485.1 0 and real property worth $12,77 5.50j thereby assuring her of a substantial ''nest egg~'~ We submit
that respondents' above contention is erroneous and is,
also, contrary to the drrect holding of the Court in In re
Missetfs Will~ 136 ~.Y.S. 2d 923 (cited at p. 19 of pitffs~

brief).
E~

Respondents object to the reference in plaintiffs) brief
to the Federal Estate Tax Return \vhich 'vas produced
by respondents~ attorneys upon Fannie's deposition. Respondents claim it is not clear for what purpose plaintiffs
refer to the tax retwn, that the tax return is irrelevant
and immaterial, that any reference to the document is
improper, that respondents expressly refused to stipulate
the return \vas an accurate copy of the one actually filed
for the estate~ and finally that the return was not produced
~:subject to verification)' as stated in plaintiffs~ brief at
page 9.

The Federal tax return was 'Willingly produced by
respond cnts~ attorney, Mr. Col ton, at the de position to
assist plaintiffs' attorneys in their examination of Fannie.
It was secured by 1vlr~ Colton from the estate"s files in the
possession of the a ttorncys for the estate~ It was assumed
by Mr. Colton to be a true copy of the return actually
filed by }i~annie for the estate. Although refusing to stipulate that the return could be admitted into evidence
until verified further, Mr. Colton did stipulate at the
deposition that it was his understanding the document vvas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a true and accurate copy of the estate tax return. Crossexamination of Fannie on the basis of the return as produced thus proceeded .subject only to the right in respondents' attorneys to verify the complete accuracy of the
return before its formal admission into evidence. Thi~~
appears from the following colloquy of counsel in Fannie's
dcposi tion :

''Mr. Rosen:* Can we concede for the record
that the United States Estate Tax Return on the
estate of Frederick Samuel Auerbach~ signed by :vf rs.
Samuels as the executrix~ sho,vs a tota] gross estate
for tax purposes of $620~857 .98 and ...
MrL Colton: **Now before you go any further,

because I will have to identify the source of this and
I hadn't gone to the original: I assume this is a true
copy of the one filed. This \vas obtained by me from
the firm of Ray, l~a\vlins) Henderson and Jones~ and
it was a part of their file that they gave me; that is,
they gave me the pleadings and that4 I assume it is an
accuratc copy but I don~ t knovv; I \\ 0uld rather not
stipula tc. ~, ( p. 79)
7

Again,
~'Mr.

Colton: '\' es, but my qualification knocks
o~t the entire stipulation. I will stipulat(: at this
ttme that it is our understandingj it is a true and
accurate copy of the estate tax return/) (p~ 80)

Again,
''Mr. Colton: l\ ow wait, 1 will not stipulate we
can admit this in evidence lllltil we verify it further .
(p. 80)
Again,

''Mr4 Gihnour~ ~1r. Rosen, it might assist Mr~
Colton in his problem to know that the tax computed
~--

.Representing Plaintiffs.
~._R~presenting
R-r:spond
ents.
Sponsored by
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on that return is the same dollars and cents figures
as sho\VIl in the court file as having been paid to the
Federal Govermnent for estate taxes.

Mr. Rosen: will that help you, Mr. Colton?
Mr. Colton: It would be very interesting. I have
no reason to doubt it is an accuraie copy:J b-ut the
source it came to me, it should be verified before we
enter any stipulation about the document~' (pp.
81-2) (Emphasis added)
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the statement
in plaintiffs~ brief {p. 9) that a copy of the F edcral tax
return of the estate was produced by Mr. Colton upon
Fannie's deposition (subject to verification) is quite accu~
rate and that the statement in respondents' brief (p. 42)
that the return \.vas not introduced •'"sub ject to verification ~' is quite inaccurate.

We mention this for the reason that respondents at..
tempt to distract the court and brush away the tax return
as "rrrevelant and immaterial.'' To the contrary the tax
return was pertinent to the issues raised in the pleadings.
Plaintiffs wished to show~ it1 the first place, as alle,ged in
the complaint, that the Federal estate tax of $89~018.19
deducted in full by Farurie in computing net value for the
purpose of plaintiffs' legacies~ in fact included a large
portion of tax on the large non-testamentary assets of
insurance and jointly held property (approximating
$134,000400). This, as alleged) vlas shovm. Plaintiffs
also \vished to show the basic and inherent incongruity of
Fannie sho\ving a net estate one minute, of $55 7)950 to
the Federal Govcrrunent and then turning around and
showing a net estate the next minute to the court of only
$3301382i both net values being determinable (except for
the non~testamentary assets) on e ssentialz,_, the .rame basis
ofSponsored
computation
as of the same date~ namely), date of death.
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The tax return, of course, would have no pertinence on
values at time of distribution but the question of values
at time of distribution is not here in issue . *
•Fannie and her husband, as co-trustees, took O"V"tt the residue of the es.tate
at a ,,.alue of $45J,979.96 at the tim-~: of di:nributior.. as shown on pages
13-14 o£ plaiot~ffs' brief.

F.
Respondents contend (pp . 13-14) that the reference
by plaintiffs to the memorandum opinion of the trial
court is improper and should be disregarded. However,
their authori tics do not support this contention.

Grand Central 1.VIr Co . V~ Mammoth Af. Co., 29 Utah
49~ BJ Pac~ 648 is entirely different from the facts herein
involved. There the Court refused to permit appellants
to establish error on the basis of the lower Court] s opinion,
written before judgment. However, it did not preclude
counsel from citing the opinion on the appeal, saying
(p. 684}:
~' .. ~

Nor is his act in delivering such an opinion
one upon which error can be predicated) although
counsel may cite the document in argument.~' (Emphasis added)
Plaintiffs~

right to refer to the memorandum opinion
in their brief is further supported by another of the cases
cited by respondents, namely, Terry u~ Terry~ 70 Idaho
161, 213 Pr2d 906. There the Court said (p~ 910}:

'' . 4 4This Court has considered it not improper
in_ order to call attention to the the cry adopted by the
trial court to refer to the memorandum decision.''
(Emphasis added)
The plaintiffs, here, have cited the memorandum
opinion to indicate the basis of the trial Court~s judgment.
Thus) even
the
Central
andof Museum
Terry
cases~
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supraJ cited by respondents, plaintiffs' reference \vas perfectly proper.

Nor does Victor M. Co . v. National Bank, 18 Utah
87, 55 Pac. 72 support the proposition for which it is cited
by respondents. It held merely that the lower Courfs
opinion could not be regarded as a Hfinding of factsrn
Actually, the Court, in referring to the opinion; stated
that it {p~ 73) :

''

~

. . rna y be of great importancc on account of
the information which it imparts respecting the Iegal
principles which govern the court and should guide
the 1i tigants. . . ~'
Respondents rely heavi1y on L. Romano Engineering
Corp. t. State, 8 Wash~ 2d 670, 113 P.2d 549 ( 1941) for
the proposition that any subsPquent statement by the
lower Court should have no effect on the judgment.
Again, the facts in that case bear no resemblance to those
before this Court. There the memorandum opinion \vas
written {p. 553) :
"After the record in the case was complete, the
judgment made and filed~ notice of appeal given, and
the sta tern en t of fa c t.s certi ficd. ~'
Here the memorandum opinion \vas 'vritten on June
5~ 1959, only a few days after judgment n~as entered
(May 28~ 1959), and long before the notice of appeal and
designation of the record on appeal were filed.
Additionally) the Court, in the Romano case, found
the opinion to be nothing more than a ~~colloquy bet\'\~een
court and counsel ~. In the instant case the memorandum
opinion
is not the result of mere ('"colloquy~"~"~ It is a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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determination made by the Court upon all of the evidence
previously presented to it by both parties on the hearing
he 1d on :\1 a y 7, 1959.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs arc not citing the memorandum opinion to qualify or limit the judgment bur.~ as
we have indicated, to call the attention of this Court to
the basis of the lo,ver Courfs judgment. We submit that
this is entirely proper and in accord with the authorities,
including those cited by respondents.
The other authorities cited by the respondents, for
similar reasons, have no application.

G.
Respondents seek to avoid the principles laid down
by the authorities cited by plaintiffs at pages 25-29 of
their brief by contending that the facts are e.ntirely different from the case at bar (pp. 19~23).. Contrary to respondents' contention, we submit) that a study of the facts
in these authorities will reveal a striking resemblance to
those present here.
Further, respondents assert (p. 20) that since Fannie
petitioned the Court for an interpretation of the \Vill~
her conduct was in accord with a statement made by the
Court in Rice v. Rice_, 117 Utah 27. Respondents~ assertion~ hovlever~ is misleading. They attempt to support
their position by relying upon a statement in the opinion
taken entirely out of context. It is clear from the opinion
that the Court had in mind an Hintcrprctation of the
based upon an adversary proceeding and not a proceeding such as the May 1940 proceeding involved herein~

war)

We submit that the authorities cited in plaintiffs~ brief
are applicable
and fully support plaintiffs' position herein~
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H.
The cases cited by respondents (pp. 25-36) for the
proposition that plaintiffs are barred by the statute of
limitations and laches are not in point. Those cases do not
in valve extrinsic fraud~ or mistake_, or both :such as is here
present. They are not applicable .
!I

CONCLUSION
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELO\Y
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND PLAINTIFFS~

MOTION

FOR

SC:VIMARY

JUDGlviEN1~

GRANTED4

Respectfully

submitted~

C. M. GILMOUR~
Kearns Building)
Salt Lake City, Utah
REICHMAN~

\·!ERXON &
Kearn~ Building.l
Salt Lake City~ "Utah

BEX~ETT~

SHEARMAN & STERLING &
20 Exchange Place;
New York 5, New York

\VRIGHT~
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